Three federal decisions California workers should know

California workers usually sue under California law, for good reasons this site has catalogued. But three recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions lowered federal bars that once justified ignoring the federal claims entirely. The calculus changed; here is where.

I · Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346

In brief. A police sergeant was transferred out of an intelligence unit — same rank, same pay, worse everything else. Lower courts demanded proof of “materially significant” disadvantage. Held: Title VII requires no such heightened showing; a discriminatory transfer need only leave the worker worse off with respect to some term or condition of employment.

The comparative point. California’s own adverse-action standard asks whether an action materially affected the job — a word our retaliation primer spends a section on. After Muldrow, the federal discrimination standard is, for transfers and similar moves, arguably more forgiving than the state one. For the client whose harm is a sideways move — prestige, schedule, trajectory, but not pay — the federal count is no longer the afterthought. It may be the anchor.

II · Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447

In brief. A postal worker sought Sabbath observance; the government leaned on a 1977 gloss letting employers refuse religious accommodations at anything more than trivial cost. Held: “undue hardship” under Title VII means what it says — a burden substantial in the overall context of the employer’s business, not a de minimis inconvenience.

The comparative point. FEHA’s religious-accommodation duty was already stronger than the old federal floor, which is why this site’s accommodation writing lives in state law. Groff raised the federal floor toward the state’s. The practical effect is for multistate employers and federal-forum cases: the “any cost is too much” refusal is dead in both systems now, and the schedule-versus-Sabbath cases that were quietly declined for years deserve fresh reads.

III · Murray v. UBS Securities (2024) 601 U.S. 23

In brief. A research analyst reported pressure to skew reports, then was fired; the Second Circuit required him to prove the employer’s “retaliatory intent.” Held, unanimously: the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower statute requires no such showing — the employee proves his protected activity was a contributing factor, and the burden shifts to the employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence it would have acted anyway.

The comparative point. Readers of our Lawson work will recognize the architecture, because it is the same one: contributing factor, then clear-and-convincing same-decision proof. Murray confirms the framework federally for finance-sector whistleblowers, as Lawson did for section 1102.5. For a California financial-services employee, the two statutes now run in parallel on the friendliest burden structure in employment law — a coordination question, and an opportunity, our whistleblower practice handles deliberately.

The thread

Each decision removed a judge-made heightening that had accreted onto a statute’s plain text — “materially significant,” “de minimis,” “retaliatory intent.” That is also the through-line of the California decisions this library tracks, from Lawson to section 12923. The direction of travel, in both systems, is toward the words as written. We plead accordingly, in whichever forum — or both — serves the client.

Notes

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346 · Groff v. DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447 · Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC (2024) 601 U.S. 23. State-law counterparts as discussed: Gov. Code §§12923, 12940; Lab. Code §§1102.5–1102.6; Yanowitz; Lawson.

Related writing: Four years of Lawson v. PPG · How discrimination is actually proved · The interactive process

This article states California law as of its revision date and is analysis, not legal advice. Reading this site does not create an attorney-client relationship. Attorney advertising.